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COVER YouR EARS
John H. Garvey*

Lee v. Weisman1 holds that public schools cannot offer
prayers at graduation ceremonies. It has another curious implication: according to George Dent, it also means that public schools
must excuse religious dissenters from offensive parts of the currculum. I think this is an astute observation. The issues are not alike
doctrinally Weisman is an Establishment Clause case; the currculum cases are Free Exercise cases.2 But the schools cause similar
harms in both cases; they do so mostly by exposing children to
unwelcome ideas. Why is this so upsetting? Why object to hearing
people talk? I want to make three observations: the first is about
harms; the second is about causation; and the third is about justifying rules that shield children from ideas.
A.
First as to harms, I contend that they are similar in the two
cases I am comparing. School prayer can cause a variety of harms.
Some are institutional. An approved mode of worship sows discord
by favoring some sects over others. It also undermines religious
pluralism, which Madison said is our best safeguard for religious
liberty 3 But Weisman focuses on individual rather than institutional harms. I can think of four types of individual harm. They don't
all happen in every case; they vary with the pressure the school
* Ashland Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky; A.B., 1970 Notre Dame; J.D.,
1974 Harvard University.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. There are actually two lands of curriculum cases. Some children assert a free exerctse right to be excused from instruction that contravenes their religious beliefs. E.g.,
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Some children assert that public schools violate the Establishment
Clause by teaching a religion of secular humanism. E.g., Smith v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), revd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). I am
interested in the first land of case; I find the second claim implausible.
3. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
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exerts and the beliefs the dissenter holds.
The first type of harm .occurs only when the school acts coercively, and it has a different significance for religious and
nonbelieving dissenters. It is the humiliation that attends being
forced to do something against one's will. The secular version of
when he loses a fight.
this harm is what the schoolboy suffers
4
Sawyer
Tom
in
happened
what
is
Here
In an instant both boys were rolling and tumbling m the
dirt, gripped together like cats; and for the space of a
minute they tugged and tore at each other's hair and
clothes, punched and scratched each other's noses, and covered themselves with dust and glory Presently the confusion took form and through the fog of battle Tom appeared, seated astride the new boy, and pounding him with
his fists.
"Holler 'nuff!" said he.
The boy only struggled to free himself. He was crying
- mainly from rage.
"Holler 'nuff!" - and the pounding went on.
At last the stranger got out a smothered "Nuff!" and
Tom let him up and said:
"Now that'll learn you. Better look out who you're
fooling with next time."
The religious version is the harm that occurs when a believer
is forced to renounce, by word or deed, a faith that she still believes in her heart. Here in addition to humiliation there is something like the religious equivalent of desertion - abandoning the
service of a sovereign God. This is the point of the biblical story
5
about the mother and her seven sons put to death by Antiochus:
It happened also that seven brothers and their mother
were arrested and were being compelled by the lng, under
torture with whips and cords, to partake of unlawful
swine's flesh. [After her first six sons were put to death
the mother was asked to plead with the seventh. She said
to him:] "I beseech you, my child, to look at the heaven
and the earth and see everything that is in them, and rec-

4. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES

(1876).
5. 2 Macc. 7:1-29.

OF TOM

SAWYER 17

(Signet Classic

1980)
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ogmze that God did not make them out of things that
existed. Thus also mankind comes into being
Accept
death, so that m God's mercy I may get you back again
with your brothers."
This is what the Jehovah's Witnesses complained about in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette6 and in Wooley v.
Maynard.7 And it was an issue m Weisman: "the dissenter of high
school age
is being forced by the State to pray in a manner
28
not allow
will
her conscience
The second type of harm is closely related to the first but it
happens, I think, only to the religious dissenter. It is that by participating in an objectionable ceremony the believer causes scandal to
others of her faith.
This may be what the Court was hinting at when it said that
"a reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that [by standing and remaining silent during] the group exercise [she] signified
her own participation or approval of it." 9 The Court conceded that
one could stand and remain silent out of "simple respect for the
views of others."10 One who does so is guilty of no renunciation.
But she might fear that others of her religion could read her intentions wrongly, and commit the sin of renunciation by imitating
her deed (not her thought). This is the point of another story about
Antiochus - the death of the scribe Eleazar. 1
Eleazar,
a man now advanced in age and of noble
presence, was being forced to open his mouth to eat
swine's flesh.
Those who were in charge of that unlawful sacrifice
took the man aside, because of their long acquaintance with
him, and privately urged him to bring meat of his own
providing, proper for him to use, and pretend that he was
eating the flesh of the sacrificial meal which had been
commanded by the king, so that by doing this he might be
saved from death, and be treated kindly on account of his

6. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring children to say the Pledge of Alligiance in school
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
7. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot require individual to display "Live Free or Die"

on automobile liscense plate).
8.

112 S. Ct. at 2658.

9. L
10. Id.
11. 2 Macc. 6:18-25.
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old friendship With them.
"Such pretense is not worthy of our time in life," he
said, "lest many of the young should suppose that Eleazar
in his ninetieth year has gone over to an alien religion, and
through my "pretense, for the sake of living a brief moment
longer, they should be led astray because of me, while I
defile and disgrace my old age."
The third type of harm, like the first, has a religious and a
secular version. Whether or not the school engages in coercion,
parents may fear that exposure to prayer will cause their children
to hold false beliefs. Coercion makes this more likely But even if
participation is voluntary, the teaching authority of the institution
and its agents gives the message an air of credibility And even if
we set aside the school's teaching authority, it may happen that
simple exposure to a particular message (especially if it is frequently repeated) will suffice to convince students of its truth. TV and
popular music have no teaching authority, but the religious right
objects to their programming content because children will come to
believe what they hear.
For the religious believer, holding a false belief is heresy In
heresy there is no humiliation or insincere denial (as there is when
one has to say 'uncle'). The harm is that the heretic, even if honestly persuaded, affronts God by denying God's truth, and may
lose his soul (or at least have a harder time saving it). This is a
common theme in school prayer cases, where the dissenters are
often religious parents worried about the effect that unorthodox
prayers will have on their children. The plaintiffs in Abington
School District v. Schempp,12 for example, were Unitarians who
said that the Lord's Prayer and the Bible portrayed God anthropomorphically, at variance with their beliefs.
The secular version of heresy is simple error. We might say
that holding any false belief is a bad thing. It is better to know
that Hank Aaron holds the record for career home runs than to
think that Babe Ruth does. But schoolteachers lead children into
lots of errors that the Constitution says nothing about. Is there,
from a secular point of view, any special harm in holding false

12. 177
(1960); on
also Engel
ber of the

F. Supp. 398, 400 n.i i (E.D. Pa. 1959), vacated and remanded, 364 U.S. 298
remand, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aft'd, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (plaintiffs included a Unitarian, a Jew, a memSociety for Ethical Culture, and a nonbeliever).
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religious beliefs? It is possible that there are some truths -(e.g., that
God exists) intrinsically more worth knowing than others (e.g., that
Hank Aaron hit 755 home runs). It is also likely that correct belief
about some truths has more important consequences. If there is a
God, we wouldn't want to be mistaken about that. If there isn't,
that knowledge could also have important ramifications for our life
plans. And parents who hold the latter belief would naturally want
their children to be correctly informed.
The fourth type of harm is closely related to the third, but it
happens only to religious believers. One whose religion condemns
school prayer, and who joins in willingly, is guilty of idolatry
This person differs from Weisman, Barnette, and Maynard in that
her participation is voluntary- she worships idols because she has
come to believe in them. And she comes to that belief through the
teaching of the school and the influence of her fellow students.
I have been talking about the individual harms that school
prayer may cause. Let me now show how the harms in curriculum
cases are similar.
The first harm that I mentioned was forced renunciation. This
will happen in curriculum cases when children are required to
recite (or repeat on tests) secular truths that they deny Professor
Dent gives an example: a child may be given a failing mark in
biology for reciting that "God created the World, and God created
man." 3 If the state requires her to recite some other formula, it is
acting like Antiochus or the West Virginia State Board of Education. There is something particularly obnoxious about this kind of
harm, and I think that where it happens courts will be willing to
grant exemptions. The Sixth Circuit in Mozert v. Hawlans County
Board of Education14 took pains to point out hat that case involved no affirmation of belief.
The second type of harm - causing scandal - will probably
occur less often in curriculum cases than in the school prayer
cases. Prayer is an exercise that students can actively join in. This
is not always true with classroom teaching. Unless the student is
asked to affirm her belief in the subject, her real complaint is that
it's being taught, not that people will think she believes it. Of
course if the school does require an affirmation, this harm is a
second reason for holding the requirement unconstitutional.

13. George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 713, n.42 and accompanying text (1993).
14. 827 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
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By and large, though, I think that the third and fourth types of
harm are what people worry about in curriculum cases. The third is
the problem of false belief. Sometimes this is heresy in the standard sense: what science says about evolution or the earth's age is
mconsistent with what (some people say) the Bible says. Bowdlerized accounts of the middle ages or the Pilgrim settlements can tell
a false story about (what some people say is) God's role m history Sometimes the problem is moral rather than theological error.
Professor Dent mentions a variety of beliefs - about AIDS, divorce, sex education, family roles, and moral relativism - that
schools teach and religious conservatives reject. 5 Simple exposure
to this point of view may be enough to persuade children that it is
right, especially if the exposure is constant. Add to the exposure
the deference that school authorities command and the danger
increases.
The fourth harm is that students will begin to act in conformity
with false beliefs. In the case of school prayer this is, from a
religious point of view, idolatry But classroom teaching is not a
religious service, and parents aren't worried about idolatry as such.
The greater danger here is that children will act in conformity with
moral error - i.e., commit sin. The subliminal message behind
"Limit the number of sexual partners" is "It's OK to have a few
sexual partners." If children act on that counsel, many people
would say that they act wrongly
B.
I have been tallng about harm. Let me now turn to my second point, causation. It is Professor Dent's observation about this
issue that I find so interesting. Religious traditionalists maintain
that school prayer causes no harm because it is voluntary School
officials argue, in a like veto, that classroom teaching causes no
harm because it does not require any affirmative response from the
student. 16 Dent says that if the first group is wrong (as Weisman

15. Dent, supra note 13, at 708-09 nn.3-19 and accompanying text.
16. E.g. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1065:
The requirement that students read the assigned matenals and attend reading
classes, in the absence of a showing that tis participation entailed affirnation
or denial of a religious belief, or perfornance or non-performance of a religious
exercise or practice, does not place an unconstitutional burden on the students'
free exercise of religion.
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holds), then the second is also. Weisman would thus support a free
exercise right to be excused from classes.
The defenders of the prayer in Weisman argued that it caused
no harm because the exercise was entirely voluntary Weisman
could avoid praying in any one of three ways: (1) she could slp
the commencement - attendance was not mandatory; (2) she could
remain seated and make her nonparticipation publicly clear; or (3)
she could remain silent dunng the prayers, and "meditate on her
own religion, or let her mind wander." 7 There is some truth to
each of these points, but the interesting thing about the Court's
decision is its willingness to find that Weisman was coerced despite these alternatives.
The Court observed that option (1), though formally correct,
was not a realistic possibility Slpping graduation is a pretty high
price to pay for a student who doesn't want to pray The Court is
quite right about this.
As for options (2) and (3), the Court said they can't stand up
to peer pressure. Of course Weisman's peers are not subject to the
Establishment Clause; theirs is private (not state) action. But the
school is responsible for creating the environment (the assembly,
the speaker, the invocation and benediction) in which the pressure
can operate.
The interesting question is not whether there is state action but
whether peer pressure actually exerts a coercive force on the student who wants to sit and ignore the service. I would concede the
pressure to stand. It's hard enough to sit through the wave or a
standing ovation; it's harder still in this situation, because remaining seated bespeaks disrespect. For that very reason, though, the
act of standing has an uncertain social meaning. It can signify
participation; but it can mean something else. My grandfather always stood up when a lady came into the room; standing while
others pray can have that land of meaning. A person who stands
out of respect has not been forced to suffer the first kind of harm
(to say 'uncle'). And because standing has an ambiguous social
meaning it is unlikely to cause the second kind of harm (scandal
to a dissenter's coreligionists).
I would also concede that Weisman is forced to hear the
rabbi's prayer. She could in theory "meditate on her own religion,
or let her mind wander" instead. She could try to think about pink
elephants, but she wouldn't succeed unless the invocation really
17. 112 S. CL at 2658-59.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:761

didn't matter to her. She could cover her ears, but that would be
more offensive than sitting, and she shouldn't have to insult people
to maintain her own integrity So suppose she hears it. This does
not cause either the first or the second type of harm (saying
"uncle" or causing scandal), because hearing is not an act that
communicates meaning to others. Hearing can cause the third and
fourth type of harm (false belief and idolatry) if the student likes
what she hears and joms in because she is won over. The rabbi
would have to be a pretty good speaker to accomplish this. But we
shouldn't just look at his prayer. If we approve his prayer, then we
will have prayers on other occasions. We need to consider the
consequences of allowing a social practice, not a single event. The
more interesting point about having to hear is that anything we say
here carries over with more force to the school curriculum - a
point I will take up shortly
Is there further pressure on Weisman to break her silence - to
say "amen" 9 I think not. Nobody's checking, and the tune for saying it is fleeting, so people can remain silent and not be noticed.
It's not quite like the recitations in Engel'8 (the Regents' Prayer)
and Schempp19 (the Lord's Prayer), which lasted longer. At graduation students may also sit with their parents, so they don't even
have to worry about the people next to them. There is a kind of
herd instinct that can sweep the audience up in the enthusiasm of
the moment. I can imagine a student thmking, "Everyone's doing
it, so I'll join in." This once happened to me at a James Brown
concert. But it is more like exposure than coercion.
In sum, I think that the objectionable feature of graduation
prayer is that it forces children to hear an unwelcome message.
This can result in two kinds of harm: they might come to believe
what they hear; and they might even act on it.2" These are not
trivial harms. In fact they are, as Professor Dent points out, the
cause of complaint in the school curriculum cases, to which I now
turn.
In one way the curriculum cases are more coercive than
Weisman. Weisman's graduation was in theory optional; school is

18. 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
19. 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
20. I should reiterate what I said at the outset: school prayer causes institutional as
well as individual harms. My own feeling is that the former are a better reason for holding it unconstitutional. Weisman is interesting for what it says about individual harms,
which carry over more easily to Free Exercise cases.
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not. Private schools are available, but they are very expensive
(certainly a higher price to pay than foregoing commencement). So
attendance is not voluntary But there may be no coercion once
you're there. Classes don't stand en masse and recite Darwin. The
only real danger of coercion comes from the teacher, who can
mark people down for giving wrong answers on a test. Unless this
happens there is no type one or type two harm (renunciation, scandal). The more likely harms come from simple exposure. Some
students will naturally come to believe, and to act on, what they
hear day after day In this they run a risk rather like Deborah
Weisman's.
C.
Suppose I am right about all this. Weisman holds that forced
exposure to religious ideas is a bad thing. Others say that forced
exposure to anti-religious ideas is also a bad thing. Both advocate
protecting our children against exposure." Is this idea as antediluvian as it sounds?
No. It is not even prima facie illiberal. Notice that in each case
we're talking about limiting speech by the government. There is no
question of limiting the rights of willing private speakers. Moreover we are talking about forced, not voluntary, exposure. The
audience is free to hear prayers (or Darwin) if they want. Finally,
the audience is made up of children, and even people with impeccable liberal credentials (like Mill') allow that children's freedoms don't have the same scope as an adult's.
Still, limiting a child's exposure seems inconsistent with other
things we believe. The Supreme Court has said several times that
"The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."' 3 Wide exposure and limited exposure are
different things. Why would anyone want to limit a child's exposure?
Let me begin with the religious dissenters in curriculum cases.
On one point they agree with the free speech tradition of Milton,

21. Weisman would protect a larger group (all children m public schools). Parents m
cumculum cases just want to protect their own.
22. JOHN S. MIL, ON IBERTY 9 (Rapaport ed. 1978).
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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Mill, and Popper: they believe that there are true and false ideas
about God, science, history, and right conduct, and that it is important to hold the true ones. In fact we might say that they believe
more firmly in the truth than their liberal counterparts: they believe
that it is more important to hold the truth blindly than falsity with
one's eyes open. It is better, for example, to hold with child-like
faith to the truth found in Genesis than to choose (maybe wrongly)
from among all available theories about the origin of life.
There are things to be said for this point of view I put to one
side as unworthy the feeling of infantile security that this gives the
believer. Apart from that I can think of at least three arguments for
the religious stance of willful ignorance. One is that it may be
better for the community, if not for the individual believer: it reduces the chance that the individual, by falling into error, will
mislead others. Aquinas said that we could execute heretics for
causing this very kind of trouble. "For it is a much graver matter
to corrupt the faith
than to forge money
Wherefore if
forgers of money [can be] condemned to death by the secular
authority, much more reason is there for heretics
to be
2
4
put to death."
A second is that knowledge is not the only virtue. Those who
know God have other obligations to him: worship, obedience to his
commandments, etc. One who holds the truth blindly carries out
these other obligations. One who errs while searching will not.
The third argument holds that sometimes it is easier to lead
people to the truth than it is for them to find it on their own - or
to put it more bluntly, "authoritative selection" is sometimes a
better path to real understanding than "wide exposure." This is
something that many different churches tell their members. My
own church used to maintain an index of books that people should
not read. It still requires authors to get approval for certain publications (though the range is now pretty narrow).5 This argument
rejects the liberal assumption that truth will always prevail in a
free and open encounter with falsehood. And there are respectable
reasons for doing so. The usual claim on freedom's behalf is that
truth will prevail over the long run. "But the validity of this re-

24. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 2-2, Q.11, art. 3 (Burns Oates &

Washington Ltd. 1916).
25. See generally James A. Conden, The End of the Impnmatur, 44 THE JURIST 339
(1984); Code of Canon Law, can. 823-832 (1983); Censorship of Books, I SACRAMENTUM
MUNDI 280 (1968).
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sponse depends on just how long the long run is."26 Where the
salvation of individual souls is at stake we may not have the luxury of waiting for truth to win out.
This system can't work for everybody We can't all hold the
truth blindly and help one another (the blind leading the blind) to
a better understanding. There has to be some authoritative guide
for the rest of the group to rely on. This is the role that religious
hierarchies sometimes claim for themselves, and that a literal understanding of the Bible plays among Christian fundamentalists.
But we don't need to go that deep to address our present problem.
The question here is just whether there is a reason for covering
children's ears; never mind about the rest of the population.
I have been talking about why a religious person might want
to limit her child's exposure to the public school cumculum. Can
we give the same reasons for shielding children from school
prayer 9 To a certain extent, yes. People with religious scruples
could make the very same (willful ignorance) arguments against
prayer as they do against the curriculum. But some of these arguments are inherently religious; they do not work well for secular
objectors. The sole exception may be the last one. It doesn't take a
religious experience to make a parent believe that truth will not
prevail over falsehood in his child's mind, and that limiting exposure can be a good idea.

26. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 27 (1982).

